Mechanism Design for Contributor Governance in Crowdsourced News Platforms: Reputation, Role Promotion, and Phase-Transition Analysis
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Crowdsourced news platforms rely on open contribution, so their content quality is vulnerable to malicious contributors—astroturfers (“water armies”), sockpuppets, and on–off sleeper accounts—that can poison content and manipulate the agenda at low cost. We formalize contributor governance as a mechanism-design problem that jointly combines a differentiated reputation-scoring model, a reputation-driven role-promotion hierarchy (editor, reviewer, aggregator, committee), and a reputation-weighted supermajority consensus rule. Using a discounted dynamic payoff model with an explicit multi-layer detection technology and evolutionary game theory, we prove that honest contribution is a Nash equilibrium under a penalty–quality–work ordering and a detection-dependent incentive-compatibility condition. Within a mean-field replicator model, we derive an explicit phase-transition threshold beyond which content quality collapses, with the tolerable fraction increasing in the penalty and the detection probability. We show that reputation filtering extends the one-third weighted-voting bound: when a fraction s of malicious accounts are sleepers and their selection-weighted average committee weight is κ times that of honest contributors, the expected-weight benchmark tolerates a total malicious fraction below 1/(1+2sκ) with a strict margin, which reduces to 1/(2s+1) when κ=1. We characterize the promotion threshold and the cold-start/Sybil trade-off. Numerical experiments comparing against no-governance, consensus-only, and EigenTrust-style reputation baselines confirm that the joint design combines weighted-voting safety with an extended tolerance.
Source: Mathematics
DOI: 10.3390/math14224251
Authors: Huitong Ding, Juan Zhang, Changsheng Wan
Institutions: Nanjing University, Southeast University
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $3,137
OpenAlex ID: W7235972890
