Preventing Fiscal Crises under Decentralization: Intergovernmental Policies and Public Sector Institutions
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: How do intergovernmental policies and public-sector institutions shape the dynamics of fiscal unsustainability within decentralized systems? Can intergovernmental transfers, controls by the central government over local fiscal borrowing, or institutional quality serve as effective safeguards against fiscal crisis risk? Using a cross-country panel fiscal dataset, we employ the instrumental variable probit estimation method to address potential endogeneity concerns. We find that intergovernmental transfers are generally associated with a lower probability of a fiscal crisis, likely reflecting their role in facilitating interregional risk sharing among local governments. The stabilizing effects of transfers are particularly evident during episodes of fiscal distress triggered by credit events, large-scale official financing, and extreme market pressures, although their effectiveness appears to vary according to local public finance conditions. In contrast, central controls such as subnational fiscal rules are associated with a higher likelihood of a fiscal crisis during crisis periods, while such relationships reverse when countries have good governance. We also uncover evidence of moral hazard associated with intergovernmental transfers in countries exhibiting high levels of vertical fiscal imbalance. Yet, we could not find statistically significant direct evidence on the effects of public-sector institutions with respect to fiscal crisis occurrence under decentralization. These findings underscore the importance of fiscal architecture and intergovernmental policy design in shaping fiscal resilience within decentralized systems. JEL Classification Numbers: H77; H72; H74; H71; D73
Source: Research Square
Author: Ryota Nakatani
Institution: International Monetary Fund
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7236316508
