Rooted protection: Designing optimal joint contract for realising the complementarity of forest-based solutions and financial insurance
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: As natural hazards increasingly threaten mountainous areas, Improved Forest Management (IFM) presents a promising Nature-Based Solution. We develop a Principal-Agent model where a houseowner uses both IFM and financial insurance. We demonstrate a perfect complementarity: forests filter low-severity harms, enabling insurers to provide affordable coverage for residual tail risks. This combination resolves the traditional partial insurance puzzle, enabling high or even full coverage despite unfair premiums. However, as this hybrid strategy reduces insurers’ profits, private markets fail to incentivize socially optimal levels of protection. Thus, public intervention or public insurers are needed to align private incentives with social welfare. JEL Classifications: G22 (Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies) , Q54 (Climate, Natural Disasters and Their Management, Global Warming) , D86 (Economics of Contract: Theory).
Source: Research Square
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
SDGs: Life on land, No poverty
Open Access status: green
Awards: G8200051437, G9000366681
OpenAlex ID: W7236448993
