Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Employing the 2014 mandatory pay ceiling regulation for top executives in Chinese state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) as a quasi‐natural experiment, this paper adopts a difference‐in‐differences (DiD) approach and finds that the regulation significantly reduces corporate risk‐taking among SOEs. The reduction is more pronounced under greater policy uncertainty, among firms led by younger chairpersons, and when executives experience larger pay cuts. The decline does not reflect a broad contraction in investment. Acquisition frequency and transaction value fall significantly, whereas R&D and capital expenditures remain largely unchanged. At the same time, treated SOEs increase CSR performance, CSR disclosure and employment growth. Textual analysis of Management's Discussion and Analysis disclosures reveals a corresponding reorientation of managerial attention, with greater attention to political objectives and less attention to economic objectives. Relative political orientation also becomes more positively associated with subsequent political promotion after the reform. Overall, our findings suggest that pay ceilings reweight executives' economic and political career incentives, leading them to rebalance strategic priorities rather than simply reduce managerial activity.
DOI: 10.1002/ijfe.70335
Authors: Min Bai, Zhenwei Zhang, Yue Li, Wenjing Li
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: corporate risk-taking, state-owned enterprises, Chinese SOEs, wage regulation, policy uncertainty, managerial incentives, corporate acquisition, R&D investment, capital expenditure, corporate social responsibility, corporate social responsibility disclosure, management discussion and analysis, political promotion, strategic rebalancing, managerial attention
Open Access status: bronze
Awards: G3277257401, G4990791467, G5592766913
OpenAlex ID: W7236502433
