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Monetizing National Security: Revenue-Conditioned AI Chip Exports and the Limits of Executive Power

Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: The United States restricts exports of advanced artificial-intelligence chips because access to computing power can strengthen a foreign country’s military, intelligence, and technological capabilities. In August 2025, however, the executive branch reportedly permitted Nvidia Corporation and Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. to sell certain previously restricted chips to China while expecting the companies to remit 15% of the resulting revenue to the federal government. In January 2026, the government further eased export restrictions of more advanced chips while simultaneously imposing a 25% tariff on covered processors imported into the United States before export. Although formally imposed on imports, the tariff, coupled with the relaxed export restrictions, effectively operated as an additional charge on exporting the chips to China. These arrangements blur the line between controlling exports to protect national security and using regulatory authority to generate revenue. This Note argues that the 15% arrangement violates the Export Control Reform Act if payment was required as a condition of export authorization. The arrangement also implicates the Export Clause and separation of powers when applied to chips exported from the United States. Although the later tariff rests on Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, it remains unlawful if its main purpose is collecting revenue from China-bound exports rather than adjusting imports that threaten national security. Revenue-conditioned licensing also undermines cooperation with allied governments whose semiconductor controls rest on shared security justifications. This Note proposes three reforms to address these defects: Congress should expressly prohibit direct and indirect financial conditions tied to export authorization; require advance congressional review of high-risk AI-chip licenses and related financial arrangements; and mandate allied consultation before the executive materially relaxes coordinated semiconductor controls. Together, these reforms would preserve the executive branch’s technical licensing authority while preventing it from converting export control into an independent source of revenue.
Institution: University of Miami
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7236538722
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