Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Beliefs often fail to respond to counter-evidence in ways that epistemic norms demand. In some situations, evidence is selectively attended in ways that preserve moral, political or social commitments. This paper argues that imaginative skill can facilitate rational belief revision by changing how agents attend to their existing evidence. Drawing on Nick Wiltsher’s conception of imagination as a “lens”, I argue that imaginative engagement can alter the salience and attention towards the evidence without itself supplying new evidence or changing the evidential base. Imagining alternative possibilities can create epistemic distance from anticipatory commitments, making otherwise neglected or discounted evidence more salient and thereby enabling agents to appreciate its significance. Further, it can aid doxastic justification where propositional justification already exists by altering the cognitive conditions under which existing evidence can exert its justificatory force. I conclude by arguing that the skill to imaginatively reconsider one’s commitments may constitute an epistemic virtue, the capacity of which can be improved through practice.
Source: Research Square
Author: Somreeta Paul
Institution: University of California, Santa Cruz
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7236579976
