The Inertia Dividend - Auto-Enrolment and Present Bias
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Automatic enrolment is the most cited success of behavioural public policy in the United Kingdom. Since the duty began in October 2012, workplace pension participation among eligible employees in Great Britain has risen to around 90 per cent, and the Department for Work and Pensions now counts 22.6 million eligible employees saving. This paper argues that the success has been measured on the endpoint the policy was designed to move, and that the same mechanism which moved it has a second, less examined effect. A default does not only decide whether a person saves. It also tells them how much. The behavioural literature that inspired the policy found, in its founding studies, that most automatically enrolled savers stayed at the default contribution rate in their first months, and that the default was read as advice. The British evidence fits that pattern. Between 2012 and 2021 the share of private sector eligible employees making no contribution fell by 44 percentage points; the share contributing at the statutory minimum rose by 23 points, and the share above it by 22. In 2024, 28 per cent of private sector savers in defined contribution schemes received only the minimum employer contribution, rising to 47 per cent at employers with fewer than 50 staff. The Pensions Commission reported in May 2026 that around half of lower earners contribute at the minimum rate and that 15 million people are undersaving. The paper sets out the mechanism, distinguishes what the published evidence can and cannot show, and proposes a contribution-distribution series, escalation by default, a re-framing of the minimum at the point of enrolment and pre-registered trials of default design.
Author: Brendon, Charles
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7236592746
