Work

The Conditional Case for Compulsory Long-Term Care Insurance: Market Failures, Benefit Design, and Feasibility Constraints

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Under what conditions is compulsory social insurance for long-term care justified, and how should it be designed and financed? We develop a theoretical framework integrating household choices between formal and informal care, incomplete private insurance, care externalities, benefit design, demographic change, public financing, and professional-care supply. Voluntary risk pooling may be undermined by adverse selection, while the case for compulsory coverage strengthens when insurance-market frictions, liquidity constraints, redistribution and external benefits of adequate care interact. Optimal benefits increase with dependency severity under specified conditions; a combination of care-linked services and unrestricted cash may outperform either instrument alone by balancing verifiable care provision against household flexibility. We derive a fiscal-feasibility frontier incorporating dependency ratios, benefit costs, healthcare savings, employment-related fiscal offsets and the financing base. Fiscal solvency, however, does not ensure effective coverage: when professional-care supply is inelastic, higher care-linked reimbursement is capitalised into prices rather than additional care and can reduce welfare when public funds are costly. Predictable ageing can also justify partial prefunding. The framework identifies the economic rationale, design choices and real-resource constraints governing compulsory long-term care insurance. JEL codes: I13, I18, J14, H51, D82.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7236632620
Cites: 27
Cited by:
Related to: 10