Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Philosophers of memory often assume that the extended mind hypothesis is compatible with the causal theory of memory. For extracranial resources can, the idea goes, sustain the causal connection between a past event and a present representation of it that, on causalist views, distinguishes genuine remembering. Some go as far as to claim that constructive versions of the causal theory can accommodate complementarity-based versions of the extended mind hypothesis. This paper casts doubt on these ideas by defending two claims. First, the existing arguments for compatibility are flawed. While some conflate external information storage with cognitive extension, others wrongly hold that fulfilling the conditions for cognitive extension secures the appropriate kind of causal connection for remembering. Second, constructive versions of the causal theory and complementarity-based versions of the extended mind hypothesis are in fact incompatible. For constructive causal theories require of memory traces features that functionally disparate but complementary extracranial resources systematically lack. The paper concludes by considering how parity-based versions of the extended mind hypothesis might fare within the causal theory, and how other theories of memory might be assessed for compatibility with the extended mind hypothesis.
Source: Erkenntnis
Author: Juan F. Álvarez
Institution: Ruhr University Bochum
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,290
Funder: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
OpenAlex ID: W7236729973
