Billionaire and Institutional Donor Concentration in the 2026 US Midterms: A Top-20 Contribution Share and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index Analysis of Families, Corporations, Organised Interests and Lobbyists through the Lens of Eight Economic Classes
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Purpose This paper measures how concentrated large political money was in the 2026 US midterm elections, covering billionaire families and institutional donors (corporations, trade associations, single-issue organisations such as AIPAC and the gun lobby, party-aligned nonprofits and federal lobbyists), and interprets the results through an eight-class model of political economy in which the instrument of political voice changes with economic class. Design/methodology Using the Americans for Tax Fairness (ATF) Action Fund family-level compilation of Federal Election Commission (FEC) data (172 billionaire families, US$1.716 billion, 1 January 2025–28 August 2026), the New York Times top-20 donor ranking (US$1.945 billion to mid-October 2026) Public Citizen's corporate-donor data (US$737.3 million to 23 October 2026), reported spending by organised interests, and 2025 federal lobbying filings (about US$5.08 billion), the paper computes k-family concentration ratios, Herfindahl–Hirschman indices (HHI) with bounds for unobserved donors, Gini and Theil indices, Gabaix–Ibragimov tail exponents, wealth-elasticity regressions and Monte Carlo and bootstrap robustness checks. Findings The top 20 families supplied 63.1% of billionaire money and the top 10 supplied 44.6%, yet the within-elite HHI is only 261–261, which is "unconcentrated" by antitrust standards. Concentration therefore operates mainly between classes, not within the wealth-dominant class: 172 families, about one household in 784,000, account for roughly 14.4% of projected total federal spending. Direction is far more concentrated than source: the partisan-bloc HHI is 5,630, and 83% of the money flowed through committees with no contribution limits. Under late-cycle figures the top-20 share rises to 72.9% and HHI to 596. Despite a roughly 69:29 Republican tilt, Democrats won both chambers. Corporate money is more concentrated than family money (HHI 370–388), and crypto, online-betting and AI firms supplied 53% of it. When non-family corporations join the families, five firms enter the top 20 and CR 20 is 51.8%. Organised-interest domains such as crypto, betting and Israel policy are one-sided (domain HHI ≈ 10,000), and the NRA has shrunk by four-fifths since 2016. Automakers, defence contractors and drug companies work mainly through lobbying, which is the least concentrated channel by organisation (HHI < 30) but the most concentrated by class of interest: 48 of the top 50 lobbying spenders are businesses. Attributing corporate money by equity ownership, about 87% of identified large money traces to the top 1% of households. Originality/value The paper separates intra-class from inter-class concentration, distinguishes funders from intermediaries and electoral money from lobbying, proposes a class-indexed reading of HHI for political finance and sets out a monitoring and reform agenda. JEL Classification D72 · D31 · D63 · P16 · H11 · L11
Source: Research Square
Author: Muhmmad Muqeem Islam Muqeem
Institution: National School of Public Policy
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7236806165
