Work

Property Rights, Productive Sufficiency, and the Reconstitution of Economic Power. Contractual Substitution, Institutional Capture, and a Conditional Feasibility Frontier

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Rights of control can protect specific investment and finance, yet also transmit economic power across periods. Whether productive functions can be preserved while reducing this transmission depends not only on contractual substitutes but also on what those substitutes recreate and on the capacity of powerful actors to reshape institutional rules. This paper proposes a joint feasibility test that combines the investment and pledgeability functions of rights, the effective control recreated by contractual substitutes, and the endogenous response of agents influencing institutional rules under a shared enforcement budget. A bounded model of investment and three-state wealth–power–rule feedback yields an exact local stability criterion and reduces feasible institutional comparisons to a one-dimensional search. Contractual protections may themselves recreate wealth-linked control, while financing constraints can make the least proprietary arrangement dynamically inferior to another feasible arrangement. Numerical counterexamples show that stable outcomes under fixed rules can become unstable when rule capture is admitted. A separate stock–flow argument establishes why local stability does not imply elimination of inherited rights or prevention of re-entry. These are conditional model results, not empirical estimates or a universal case against ownership. JEL classifications: D23; D31; D72; G32; P14.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7236807986
Cites: 17
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Related to: 10