Work

Reason-Giving or Rationalisation? A Conceptual Review from the Perspective of Ignorance Studies

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: The behaviour that people call justification, self-deception, denial or deliberate ignorance has emerged from separate lines of research, and how these names relate to one another is unclear. As a result, one behaviour sometimes goes by several names, and different behaviours sometimes share one name. This article is a conceptual review. It draws on examples from tales and proverbs, anthropology, experimental psychology and law, and sets out twelve situations in which reason-giving relates to ignorance, from a reason that arrives after the act to a not-knowing that is put on show. To tell these situations apart, the article proposes five questions and a table: what the reason does, whom it is for, what happened to the information, what the person is aware of, and when the reason came. The article concludes that the choice between ‘reason-giving’ and ‘rationalisation’ is a false one. We can read the function of a reason from its behaviour, not from its content. Ignorance, too, is not always a deficit, and sometimes it is a tool. The article offers two labelled hypotheses: one about the inner audience of a reason, and one about a cheap test that separates a reason that serves understanding from a reason that serves defence. What it says concerns patterns. It passes no judgement on the intention or awareness of any particular person or event.
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7236819665
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