Present but Not Protecting: A Controlled, Reproducible Study of When Linux Exploit Mitigations Actually Enforce
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: This paper investigates the gap between declared Linux exploit mitigations and their actual runtime enforcement. Thirteen controlled experiments examine memory-corruption defenses, with a focus on Intel CET shadow-stack activation, _FORTIFY_SOURCE coverage, and stack-protector instrumentation across shared-library boundaries. The study provides reproducible evidence showing why the presence of hardening features does not necessarily guarantee protection of a specific operation. Companion research artifact: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24382067
Author: Altunkapan, Deniz
Language: English
Subfield: Hardware and Architecture
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7236822790
