O Supremo Como Gurdião De Suas Próprias Decisões: Reclamação Constitucional, Fiscalização Em Massa E Confiança Institucional
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: This article examines the constitutional complaint as a means by which the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (STF) monitors compliance with its own precedents, connecting this phenomenon to the concepts of supremocracy and ministrocracy. Drawing on data from the STF and the National Council of Justice, it analyzes the growth in constitutional complaints, their predominantly single-justice adjudication, differences in grant rates among reporting justices, and the concentration of cases originating in the Labor Courts. The case-law analysis, particularly disputes concerning outsourcing and civil service contracts, shows that the application of precedents may vary according to the reporting justice and the composition of the panels. The article proposes “marginal precedent” as an analytical category to describe recurring patterns of adjudication that depart from binding precedents or fail to address them adequately, without automatically attributing illegality to individual rulings. It argues that the available data reveal a swift, individualized, and selective form of judicial oversight, but are insufficient to establish systemic noncompliance across the judiciary. The article concludes that addressing diffuse patterns of decision-making requires collective measures, including panel review in cases of recurring disagreement, systematic identification of such patterns, and stronger judicial training, with a view to promoting equality, legal certainty, and institutional trust.
Source: Paradigma.
DOI: 10.55839/t9fetb82
Language: English
Subfield: Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W7236843748
