Zoning for Votes: How Local Politicians Use Land-Use Regulations for Political Gain
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Across many levels of governments, elected officials engage in opportunistic behavior, through political budget cycles or ‘pork-barrel’ spending. Local politicians, however, have more limited ability to manipulate spending or pass popular policies due to federalist budget constraints and preemption. In the face of these constraints, I argue that local politicians use the tools at their disposal, particularly land-use regulations, treating zoning as pork. Using both lot-level zoning data in New York City and national data on historic districts, I show that land-use changes occur disproportionately on municipal election years. This effect is driven by those with the strongest electoral incentives: politicians up for reelection in competitive districts. Additionally, this zoning political budget cycle is larger for density-restrictions, consistent with anti-density public opinion, and tends to target lots with politically active residents. These findings suggest strategic electoral incentives help explain why many cities have restricted new housing despite an affordability crisis.
Source: SocArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Author: Adrian C. Pietrzak
Institution: Princeton University
Language: English
Subfield: Urban Studies
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7236858054
