Work

Governance of Unsafe Behavior in Electric Power Maintenance: A Three-Population Evolutionary Game with Endogenous Risk and a Conserved Quantity

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Maintenance crews work inside short windows on de-energized equipment, and the casualties that follow are few, severe and almost always preceded by a departure from a written procedure. Three agents decide whether that departure happens: the crew, the supervisor and the utility that pays for supervision. We model the layers as a three-population evolutionary game in which accident probability is endogenous and super-linear, penalties are proportional to fault, and the supervisor has a reason to look away. A vertex criterion classifies the eight pure-strategy states, and a Latin hypercube design with partial rank correlation ranks the parameters. Three closed-form thresholds split the risk sensitivity into four regimes, with no stable pure strategy between the last two; there the flow preserves volume in logit coordinates, the compliance face admits an explicit first integral, and the equilibrium is a nonlinear center of computable period. Costlier regulation destroys the center and makes two delegated-governance states bistable. The levers are the effort a shortcut saves, regulation cost, accountability and schedule pressure, not the penalties.
Language: English
Subfield: Safety Research
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7237237406
Cites: 43
Cited by:
Related to: 10