The Charter Price of Commitment: Ex-Post Enforcement Failure, Delegation Mandates, and Break-Even Governance Maps
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: When a regulator cannot commit ex ante to penalty enforcement, sequential discretion fails symmetrically across welfare conventions. Once strategic monitoring attention is sunk, a discretionary tribunal abandons enforcement altogether under administrative write-down accounting, collapsing to universal bailout. Conversely, under recycled-fine transfer accounting, an unchecked tribunal ignores monitor distress past a revenue edge and pushes penalties upward to an interior or statutory hold-up ceiling, collapsing monitoring to zero effort. We prove universal strict concavity of monitor certainty-equivalent growth and characterize when delegation charters restore interior compliance. Under strictly positive retained revenue, either a conservative tribunal weight mandate or a revenue-retention cap implements an engaged interior equilibrium within thin adjudication-cost tolerances. Under self-financing write-down accounting, interior delegation is impossible, forcing a binary choice between hard statutory commitment and an externally funded escrow enforcement bounty. Decomposing charter break-even budgets exposes regimes where partial charge-setter commitment underperforms discretionary anarchy, an open partial-identification band where Minimax Regret and level Maximin Welfare prescribe opposite institutions (robust on destructible seats, while reversing on insulated seats above high statutory ceilings), opposite preference-curvature effects across monitor seats, and ceiling-sensitive leakage and risk-premium qualifications.
Author: Hanaeda, Mikio
Language: English
Subfield: Public Administration
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7237244331
