An analysis of strategic-military issues in the ending of Civil wars : a case study of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1994 – 2004
Year: 2015
Type: dissertation
Abstract: This study is an analysis of how military issues can contribute to a sustainable ending \nof civil wars particularly in Africa. The continuous warfare in the Democratic \nRepublic of the Congo (DRC) between 1996 and 2004 is used to understand the \nnature of civil wars and how they relate to classical strategic theory of war in general \nand their termination in particular. \nAccording to classical strategic military theory, war must always be guided by clear \npolitical objectives. Without this, war becomes an irrational act and spins out of \ncontrol. Tactical victory gained in the battlefield over an opponent must be translated \ninto strategic victory for war to end sustainably. This can only be done if the political \nobjective of the war has been attained. But also crucial are the terms and conditions of \npeace that the victor offers the defeated opponent. \nNot all wars end with a tactical victory in the battlefield. In many instances of modern \nwars, and in particular with the current civil wars in Africa, there is a stalemate. This \nforces the belligerent parties to negotiate. Within the context of the DRC, the first war \n(1996-1997) ended in a tactical victory for the Rwandan alliance (composed of \nRwanda, Uganda and Burundi) over the regime of President Mobutu. However, this \nvictory was not translated into strategic victory (long term peace). The alliance, \ndespite having installed a new leader (Laurent Kabila) in the DRC, remained an \noccupying force, with the Rwandan military commander taking over the role of the \nDRC’s military chief of staff. This was in part because the political objectives of the \nRwandan alliance had changed from revenge on Mobutu for sheltering and supporting \nthe perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda, to economic exploitation of the abundant \nnatural resources of the DRC. The outcome was that the proxy (Kabila) turned against \nhis backers as he sought to gain legitimacy and support from his fellow Congolese \ncitizens. \nPresident Kabila ordered the Rwandan alliance out of the country. The alliance then \nstarted a second war (1998-2002) aimed at deposing the former proxy and establishing new proxies. The situation had however changed as the old proxy \n(Kabila) had acquired new partners (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe). This, apart \nfrom transforming the DRC war into Africa’s first continental war (in terms of the \nnumber of countries that were eventually involved), turned into a stalemate. This \nresulted in negotiations that took a long time to complete. \nThe first round of negotiations produced the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (LCA) in \n1999 with two independent tracks that led to two levels of agreements: inter-state \nagreements and intra-state agreements. None of these were implementable until 2002 \nwhen the DRC negotiated with Rwanda and with Uganda separately on military \nissues of the conflict. These negotiations produced the Pretoria Accords between the \nDRC and Rwanda, and the Luanda Accords between the DRC and Uganda. The \nwithdrawal of the militaries of Rwanda and Uganda from the DRC paved way for \ntheir proxies, The Rally for Congolese Democracy - Goma (Rassemblement \nCongolais pour la Démocratie - RCD-Goma) and the Movement for the Liberation of \nCongo (Mouvement de Libération du Congo – MLC) to join the Inter-Congolese \nNational Dialogue (ICND) which ended in 2004 without a conclusive agreement on \nmilitary issues.
Author: Nelson Alusala
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W747867201