Year: 2008
Type: article
Abstract: Taking a lead from existing typologies of actions in the philosophical and cognitive science literatures, we present a novel taxonomy of actions.To promote a notion of epistemic agency we distinguish theoretical (mental state-directed) from practical (world-directed) actions.Our basic structural unit is that of a teleological frame, which spans one specific goal of an agent.Relative to a given teleological frame, actions can be classified as focal (directed towards the end) or ancillary (directed towards a means).The framework is applied to further illuminate previous attempts to distinguish between pragmatic and epistemic actions (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994).Physical actions that substitute or support mental processes are re-classified as practical ancillary actions that are strategically contingent alternatives to theoretical actions.
Authors: Hansjörg Neth, Thomas Müller
Institutions: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Utrecht University
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
OpenAlex ID: W769633433