Year: 2015
Type: dissertation
Abstract: The aim of this thesis is to argue for a new metric for determining the moral status of another being.Determining this status is of foundational importance in a number of legal, political, and ethical concerns, including but not limited to animal rights, the treatment of criminals, and the treatment of the psychologically afflicted.This metric will be based upon one's capacity to morally consider others.In other words, in order to have full moral status, one must be able to have moral concern for others and act upon this concern to even a minimal degree.In doing so, one will be considered to belong to a "moral community", which affords the member a certain set of rights, privileges, and duties towards other community members.Arguing for the existence of such a community achieves the pragmatic aspect of this thesis.I argue that morality is geared towards group-survival strategies which have been evolutionarily selected for, and thus by organizing societal structures towards the tools which nature has armed us with, we may maximize the powers and capacities of the community members.In order to achieve these aims, I defend a concept of morality as based in emotion, requiring certain neurological structures, which gives the first set of criteria for identifying potential members of the moral community.I then discuss the issue of identifying the capacity for morality in non-human minds, arguing that we may infer moral capacities from behaviourism.In summary, the findings of this paper are that first, morality is essentially emotional in nature and is a product of the nature of our neurological system, although rational processes and enculturation shape particular moral sensitivities and priorities.Second, one can infer the existence of moral capacities in animals from their behaviour, and, at risk of engaging in anthropomorphism, to deny these capacities completely entails solipsism.Thirdly, and most importantly, those who are capable of morally considering others ought to be afforded full moral status themselves and be brought into a "moral community" wherein special rights, freedoms, and privileges allow the members to most efficiently contribute to the community, maximizing the powers and benefits of the community.
Author: Christopher Stephens
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W833841888