Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: IntroductionHow should our beliefs change over time?Much has been written about how our beliefs should change in the light of new evidence.But that is not the question I'm asking.Sometimes our beliefs change without new evidence.I previously believed it was Sunday.I now believe it's Monday.In this paper I discuss the implications of such beliefs for philosophy of mind.I will argue that two-dimensionalism (e.g.Perry 1979) about the objects of belief are supported over one-dimensionalism (e.g.Lewis 1979) for two related reasons.First, two-dimensionalism gives us a more natural account of belief retention.Second, the extra complexity of two-dimensionalism turns out to be independently motivated by confirmation theory.So if the argument is correct, it will be an instance where our epistemology informs our philosophy of mind.
Author: Darren Bradley
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: National Institute on Drug Abuse
OpenAlex ID: W8386968