Year: 2006
Type: book
Abstract: The dissertation argues against the idea that reasons for action are provided by human desires (I call this the Model). After spelling out three versions of the Model, I go on to attack it from three angles. I first argue that the most plausible meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism, but that the naturalist Model cannot vindicate the reduction it proposes and this is unacceptable. After this, I present and defend an approach that questions the idea that the reason-relation must make reference to human desires. The alternative approach argues that desires only transmit reasons on which they are themselves based. Finally, I argue that the right theory of motivation is cognitivist and not Humean in character.
Source: KOPS (University of Konstanz)
Author: Attila Tanyi
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W85297012