Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: Many ethical theories depend on the existence of natural teleology as a source of normativity.Natural Teleology, the purposive goal-directedness of non-conscious biological processes, is also embraced to some degree by a majority of philosophers of biology who agree that the teleological concepts of purpose, goal, defect, proper function and malfunction are legitimate, perhaps necessary, in biological explanations.In my dissertation I provide a substantive argument against the reduction of teleology to natural facts and argue that ethical theories that rely on it cannot be naturalistic.Several ethical theories could be my target, but I focus on the most overt example: neo-Aristotelian ethics.The project is in two sections, one in ethical theory and the other in philosophy of biology.In the first section of the dissertation, primarily using Philippa Foot and Judith Jarvis Thomson as models, I illustrate how Neo-Aristotelian theories rest on natural teleology.I offer a metaethical analysis of teleology, arguing that it does not belong to the good nor the right nor mere description, but rather the proper.I call this category of concept protonormativity.I claim that protonormativity, of which teleology is a paradigmatic example, does not yield normative facts and is not reducible to natural facts; it is a distinct conceptual category.In the second section I give a novel argument for why natural teleology cannot be reduced to natural facts.Teleological concepts such as "design" and "proper function" imply standards of correctness for phenotypic outcome.They entail norms for the way an item is to be in the end: functional or malfunctional, "good" or defective.However, since a phenotype is the result of a genotype in some set of environmental conditions, there can only be a proper phenotype if there exists a proper environment for the item to inhabit.Regarding artifacts, a designer is capable of setting a proper environment, but I argue science does not admit of proper environments for organisms in nature.The concept "proper environment" cannot be reduced to iv any set of natural facts.Therefore metaethical naturalists must abandon proper phenotypes, natural teleology, and ethical theories that rely on it.v There are many people who have provided valuable support and guidance as I worked on this project.First and foremost my wife Amy, who moved with me halfway across the country so that I could enter graduate school, earned enough money to support our family, and who has been nothing but encouraging and understanding through the many ups and downs that have accompanied my career choice.Thanks also to my parents who endowed me with a love of learning, and whose many gifts, both tangible and intangible, are of course immeasurable.I have relied on many friends and colleagues for professional assistance and encouragement as well.Thanks to R.G Frey for early mentorship in my graduate career, who was always willing to engage in philosophical combat with humor and patience.Thanks to Michael Bradie for inspiring me to widen my interests, opening up the bountiful literature on biological function.Thanks to Christian Coons for his attentive dedication to me and many other graduate students, and for detailed comments on many drafts of the present work.Thanks to John Basl for a great deal of helpful advice and last-minute, but thorough, participation in this project.
Author: Arthur Ward
Institution: Bowling Green State University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W857784614