Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: David Dyzenhaus is the standard bearer of a school of thought that associates the philosophy of legal positivism with undesirable consequences in real life politics.This article examines and rejects the jurisprudential underpinnings of that enterprise.It focuses, by way of a case study, on just one subset of Dyzenhaus' arguments, namely that part of his anti-positivist position that insists on a connection between legal positivism and legislative supremacy.Part I introduces Dyzenhaus' position.Part II explores three arguments that Dyzenhaus develops which connect legal positivism to legislative supremacy, the arguments from authoritarianism, irrelevance and vacuity.Part III criticises two aspects of the methodology which underlies those arguments, its projection of prescriptive commitments onto descriptive works and the austerity of its conception of what counts as a properly prescriptive argument.† 50 th Anniversary Research Lecturer in Law, University of York.I would like to thank Simon Halliday, William Lucy, Michael Stokes and two anonymous referees for prompting me, in various ways, to improve this article.
Author: Adam Tucker
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W882196611
