Work

Equilibrium Refinement through Negotiation in Binary Voting

Year: 2014

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place, to negotiate their voting strategy with the other participants. We analyse the voters' rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game, showing under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed and desirable ones sustained as a consequence of the pre-vote phase.

Source: Open Archive Toulouse Archive Ouverte (University of Toulouse)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.1404.5433

Authors: Grandi, Umberto, Grossi, Davide, Turrini, Paolo

Institutions: Université de Toulouse, University of Liverpool, Imperial College London

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

Funders: Imperial College London, European Commission, Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, FP7 People: Marie-Curie Actions