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The power of sequential single-item auctions for agent coordination
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Year:
2006
Type:
article
Authors:
S. Koenig,
C. Tovey,
M. Lagoudakis,
V. Markakis,
D. Kempe
Institutions:
University of Southern California,
Georgia Institute of Technology,
Technical University of Crete,
University of Toronto
Language:
English
Topic:
Auction Theory and Applications
Subfield:
Management Science and Operations Research
Field:
Decision Sciences
Domain:
Social Sciences
Open Access status:
closed
OpenAlex ID:
W89605384
FWCI:
5.802
Cites:
12
Cited by:
122
Related to:
10