Year: 1981
Type: article
Abstract: uR intuitive satisfaction with philosophical models of rational belief in science is, of course, highly influenced by our experience of the historical development of science as practiced.While one can go overboard in this direction, emphasizing conformity to a history infected with "accident" and neglecting critical examination of the usual standards of rationality on their own merits, surely it is reasonable to let one's views of how science ought to be influenced by how best scientific practice has historically proceeded.Clearly the long existence of geometry as the single clearly systematized and secure science was largely responsible for the persuasiveness of models of science which posited that (at least ideally) all beliefs ought to be founded upon indub itable self-evidence.The lengthy sway of Newtonian mechanics as a (possibly) all encompassing and final theory founded upon inference from the data of the senses surely was instrumental in the long domination of philosophy of science by inductivist models.And the scientific revolutions of the twentieth century, especially those aspects of the revolution which showed us that the wealth of data previously taken to support Newtonian theory was, when taken in con junction with the new data incompatible with the older theory, equally supportive of novel theories incompatible with the Newtonian, was straight-forwardly in fluential on a range of philosophies of science ranging from Popper's skepticism of the notion of inductive support through those who take the quasi-Kantian line that our very understanding of what the data is is an imposition on the world by us of our theoretical preconceptions.The question 1 want to examine here is this: Quantum mechanics and relativity show us that the data which seemed to support very well one theory can be seen, in the light of scientific change, to support as well quite different theories, theories incompatible with the older theory in deep theoretical and conceptual ways.Now consider the attempt to decide, at any moment, whether or not a given set of data supports a hypothesis.Having in mind the potential existence of a vast array of theories, genuine alternatives to the hypotheses we have brought to mind, but alternatives which we haven't yet even imagined, should we not wonder if amongst that vast array of alternatives there might not be some which, were we to know what they were like, we would consider even better supported Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1981) 17-29.003I-562I/8I/OIOO-(X)I7$1.30
Source: Pacific philosophical quarterly
Author: Lawrence Sklar
Institution: University of Michigan
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: National Science Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W92639540