Year: 2011
Type: book-chapter
Abstract: This chapter explores the prospects of a slightly different strategy in solving the value problem for the teleological account of epistemic reasons. The starting point of the strategy is to concede the main criticism of teleological accounts of epistemic reasons, namely that epistemic properties are not valuable generally and in all contexts, and that a teleological account relying on such a claim therefore fails. The notion of reasons to form beliefs about propositions or subject matters is in some respects similar to the notion of having a reason to engage in enquiry, i.e. a reason to actively pursue evidence bearing on a certain proposition or subject matter. The chapter argues that the relationship between epistemic reasons, reasons to form beliefs about certain propositions, and normative statements about what a person ought to believe, could be explained by supposing that epistemic reasons are hypothetical instrumental reasons.
Author: Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Institution: Aarhus University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W93893248