What zombies can't do: A social cognitive neuroscience approach to the irreducibility of reflective consciousness
Year: 2009
Type: book-chapter
Abstract: Could an individual act and speak just like other individuals without having any internal conscious experience? Belief in the possibility of so-called philosophical zombies serves as a litmus test for whether someone believes in some form of mind–body dualism or materialism. This chapter focuses on a related hypothesis that is emerging within psychology referred to as the psychological zombie hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that our behaviors and judgements are produced by an ‘inner-zombie’ whose mental work does not depend on conscious awareness, and that those mental operations which are typically accompanied by conscious awareness do not rely on awareness to generate the operations and their outputs. This hypothesis suggests that mental operations which are typically accompanied by conscious awareness can be produced in the absence of conscious awareness, thus demonstrating the superfluousness of awareness.
Source: Oxford University Press eBooks
Parent work: In two minds: Dual processes and beyond
Author: Matthew D. Lieberman
Institution: University of California, Los Angeles
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W948190280
