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Pierre Chaigneau

Observed names: Chaigneau, Pierre, PIERRE CHAIGNEAU
Observed institutions: HEC Montréal, National Bureau of Economic Research, Queen's University, Queens University, European Corporate Governance Institute, University of Pennsylvania
ORCID: 0000-0003-0939-7684
Observed ORCID: 0000-0003-0939-7684
OpenAlex ID: A5030032008
Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises
2015 · MATTHIEU BOUVARD, PIERRE CHAIGNEAU, et al. · The Journal of Finance · 162
Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises
2012 · Matthieu Bouvard, Pierre Chaigneau, et al. · SSRN Electronic Journal · 59
CEO Gender-Based Termination Concerns: Evidence From Initial Severance Agreements
2019 · Felice B. Klein, Pierre Chaigneau, et al. · Journal of Management · 40
Does improved information improve incentives?
2018 · Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, et al. · Journal of Financial Economics · 34
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Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation
2012 · Pierre Chaigneau · Journal of Financial Stability · 32
Executive compensation with environmental and social performance
2025 · Pierre Chaigneau, Nicolas Sahuguet · European Finance Review · 19
The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium
2018 · Pierre Chaigneau, Nicolas Sahuguet · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · 16
The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability
2014 · Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, et al. · National Bureau of Economic Research · 14
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Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation
2014 · Pierre Chaigneau · European Journal of Finance · 13
Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion
2012 · Pierre Chaigneau · Journal of Economics and Business · 12
The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation
2011 · Pierre Chaigneau · SSRN Electronic Journal · 12
The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
2018 · Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, et al. · Games and Economic Behavior · 10
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Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts
2017 · Pierre Chaigneau, Nicolas Sahuguet, et al. · Economics Letters · 9
How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?
2014 · Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, et al. · SSRN Electronic Journal · 9
How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?
2021 · Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, et al. · Review of Financial Studies · 8
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The optimal timing of CEO compensation
2017 · Pierre Chaigneau · Finance research letters · 8
Capital Structure with Information about the Upside and the Downside
2023 · Pierre Chaigneau · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · 7
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The Value of Informativeness for Contracting
2014 · Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, et al. · National Bureau of Economic Research · 7
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The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring
2022 · PIERRE CHAIGNEAU, NICOLAS SAHUGUET · Journal of Accounting Research · 6
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Executive Compensation with Environmental and Social Performance
2023 · Pierre Chaigneau, Nicolas Sahuguet · SSRN Electronic Journal · 4
The Generalized Informativeness Principle
2014 · Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, et al. · National Bureau of Economic Research · 4
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The Value of Informativeness for Contracting
2013 · Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans · SSRN Electronic Journal · 4
The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium
2011 · Pierre Chaigneau, Nicolas Sahuguet · SSRN Electronic Journal · 4
When Is (Performance-Sensitive) Debt Optimal?
2021 · Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, et al. · SSRN Electronic Journal · 3
The Value of Informativeness for Contracting
2014 · Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, et al. · London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) · 3
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Works count: 78
Citation count: 526
H-index: 11
I10-index: 12
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