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dynamic contracting
Description:
Dynamic contracting studies contracts designed for relationships in which decisions, information, or circumstances evolve over time, especially in economics.
Related topics:
Game Theory and Applications (12%),
Auction Theory and Applications (11%),
Corporate Finance and Governance (7%)
OpenAlex ID:
keywords/dynamic-contracts
Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
1998
·
O. Hart
, J. Moore
·
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
·
1,166
Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring
1995
·
E.-L. von Thadden
·
The Review of Economic Studies
·
659
The role of dynamic renegotiation and asymmetric information in financial contracting
2014
·
Michael R. Roberts
·
Journal of Financial Economics
·
429
Hybrid type checking
2006
·
Cormac Flanagan
·
ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL)
·
303
Dynamic CEO Compensation
2012
·
ALEX EDMANS
, XAVIER GABAIX
, et al.
·
The Journal of Finance
·
299
PDF
Project flexibility, agency, and competition : new developments in the theory and application of real options
2000
·
Michael J. Brennan
, Lenos Trigeorgis
·
298
The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance
2003
·
I. Hendel
, A. Lizzeri
·
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
·
275
Block Recursive Equilibria for Stochastic Models of Search on the Job
2009
·
Guido Menzio
, Shouyong Shi
·
Journal of Economic Theory
·
252
Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
1997
·
Oliver Hart
, John Moore
·
National Bureau of Economic Research
·
249
PDF
Collateral, Taxes, and Leverage
2012
·
Shaojin Li
, Toni M. Whited
, et al.
·
Review of Financial Studies
·
211
CEO-board dynamics
2020
·
John R. Graham
, Hyunseob Kim
, et al.
·
Journal of Financial Economics
·
178
PDF
Long-Term Contracts Under the Threat of Supplier Default
2008
·
Robert Swinney
, Serguei Netessine
·
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
·
171
Venture Capitalists Versus Angels: The Dynamics of Private Firm Financing Contracts
2014
·
Thomas J. Chemmanur
, Zhaohui Chen
·
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies
·
156
Low balling, legal liability and auditor independence.
1998
·
Chi-Wen Jevons Lee
, Zhaoyang Gu
·
The Accounting Review
·
148
Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and experience rating
2002
·
Cheng Wang
, Stephen D. Williamson
·
Journal of Monetary Economics
·
141
Recursive Contracts
2019
·
Albert Marcet
, Ramon Marimon
·
Econometrica
·
137
Why Innovate? Founding the Bank for International Settlements
1993
·
Beth A. Simmons
·
World Politics
·
131
Efficient Contracts with Costly Adjustment: Short-RUn Employment Determination for Airline Mechanics
1986
·
David Card
·
National Bureau of Economic Research
·
114
PDF
Optimal dynamic contracting: The first‐order approach and beyond
2019
·
Marco Battaglini
, Rohit Lamba
·
Theoretical Economics
·
94
Reward for Luck in a Dynamic Agency Model
2010
·
Florian Hoffmann
, Sebastian Pfeil
·
Review of Financial Studies
·
94
On the smoothness of value functions and the existence of optimal strategies in diffusion models
2015
·
Bruno Strulovici
, Martin Szydlowski
·
Journal of Economic Theory
·
89
PDF
The Role of Soft Information in a Dynamic Contract Setting: Evidence from the Home Equity Credit Market
2011
·
SUMIT AGARWAL
, BRENT W. AMBROSE
, et al.
·
Journal of money credit and banking
·
89
When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
2004
·
Stephen E. Spear
, Cheng Wang
·
Journal of Economic Theory
·
89
The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance
2000
·
Igal Hendel
, Alessandro Lizzeri
·
National Bureau of Economic Research
·
86
PDF
Optimal Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Costly Monitoring
2011
·
Tomasz Piskorski
, Mark M. Westerfield
·
Journal of Economic Theory
·
85
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Works count:
572
Citation count:
9,633
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