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hidden action
Description:
An economic situation in which one party’s actions are unobservable to another, creating information asymmetry in principal-agent relationships.
Related topics:
Auction Theory and Applications (15%),
Game Theory and Applications (13%)
OpenAlex ID:
keywords/hidden-action
The Economics of Agency.
1984
·
Kenneth J. Arrow
·
Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford Univ. eBooks
·
920
Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence
1998
·
Raphael Amit
, James Brander
, et al.
·
Journal of Business Venturing
·
915
Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy.
1993
·
Thomas Voss
, Gary J. Miller
·
Contemporary Sociology A Journal of Reviews
·
697
Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries With a Consumer Credit Field Experiment
2009
·
Dean Karlan
, Jonathan Zinman
·
Econometrica
·
621
PDF
Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation
2007
·
Mark Armstrong
, David E.M. Sappington
·
Handbook of Industrial Organization
·
484
Testing guilt aversion
2009
·
Tore Ellingsen
, Magnus Johannesson
, et al.
·
Games and Economic Behavior
·
329
Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing
2002
·
William H. Sandholm
·
The Review of Economic Studies
·
252
Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes
1987
·
Robert Gibbons
·
Journal of Labor Economics
·
236
Seller Reputation
2008
·
Heski Bar-Isaac
, Steven Tadelis
·
Foundations and Trends® in Microeconomics
·
205
The economics of earnings manipulation and managerial compensation
2007
·
Keith J. Crocker
, Joel Slemrod
·
The RAND Journal of Economics
·
190
Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship
1997
·
Roland Strausz
·
The Review of Economic Studies
·
188
Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking
2010
·
Ing-Haw Cheng
, Harrison Hong
, et al.
·
National Bureau of Economic Research
·
153
PDF
Why do corporations become criminals? Ownership, hidden actions, and crime as an agency cost
1999
·
Cindy R. Alexander
, Mark A. Cohen
·
Journal of Corporate Finance
·
151
Opportunism and Honest Incompetence—Seeking Explanations for Noncompliance in Public Procurement
2014
·
Katri Kauppi
, Erik M. van Raaij
·
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
·
139
Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions
2004
·
Matthias Doepke
, Robert M. Townsend
·
Journal of Economic Theory
·
136
Social distance and trust: Experimental evidence from a slum in Cairo
2013
·
Christine Binzel
, Dietmar Fehr
·
Journal of Development Economics
·
134
PDF
The Design of Performance Pay in Education
2011
·
Derek Neal
·
Handbook of the economics of education
·
134
Chapter 16 Credit markets and interlinked transactions
1988
·
Clive Bell
·
Handbook of development economics
·
132
Robust Contracts in Continuous Time
2016
·
Jianjun Miao
, Alejandro Rivera
·
Econometrica
·
129
Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts
2004
·
Alberto Bisin
, Danilo Guaitoli
·
The RAND Journal of Economics
·
129
Does credit rationing imply insufficient lending?
2000
·
David de Meza
, David Webb
·
Journal of Public Economics
·
124
Corporate Risk Management
2005
·
Richard D. MacMinn
·
WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks
·
120
Combinatorial agency
2006
·
Moshe Babaioff
, Michal Feldman
, et al.
·
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC)
·
118
Optimal Insurance under Moral Hazard
2000
·
Ralph A. Winter
·
Hübner international series on risk, insurance, and economic security
·
118
Information Asymmetries as Antecedents of Opportunism in Buyer-Supplier Relationships: Testing Principal-Agent Theory
2014
·
Claus Steinle
, Holger Schiele
, et al.
·
Journal of Business-to-Business Marketing
·
117
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Works count:
779
Citation count:
13,140
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