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optimal contracts
Description:
Agreements designed to maximize an objective while accounting for incentives, information, and constraints faced by contracting parties.
Related topics:
Auction Theory and Applications (17%),
Game Theory and Applications (10%)
OpenAlex ID:
keywords/optimal-contracts
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
1979
·
Robert M Townsend
·
Journal of Economic Theory
·
3,684
PDF
An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting
1992
·
Philippe Aghion
, Patrick Bolton
·
The Review of Economic Studies
·
2,414
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
1988
·
Oliver Hart
, John Moore
·
Econometrica
·
2,238
Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk
1991
·
D. W. Diamond
·
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
·
2,093
Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
1985
·
Douglas Gale
, Martin Hellwig
·
The Review of Economic Studies
·
2,032
Optimal contracts for central bankers
1995
·
Carl E. Walsh
·
American Economic Review
·
1,482
A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting
1990
·
Patrick Bolton
, David Scharfstein
·
American Economic Review
·
1,377
Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement
1992
·
George P. Baker
·
Journal of Political Economy
·
1,262
A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues
1982
·
DAVID P. BARON
·
The Journal of Finance
·
1,181
Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
1998
·
O. Hart
, J. Moore
·
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
·
1,158
A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
2008
·
YULIY SANNIKOV
·
The Review of Economic Studies
·
818
Optimal Unemployment Insurance
1997
·
Hugo A. Hopenhayn
, Juan Pablo Nicolini
·
Journal of Political Economy
·
701
On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
1987
·
Stephen E. Spear
, Sanjay Srivastava
·
The Review of Economic Studies
·
701
Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
1984
·
Edward C. Prescott
, Robert M. Townsend
·
Econometrica
·
617
PDF
Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity
1997
·
B. Douglas Bernheim
, Michael D. Whinston
·
American Economic Review
·
608
Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
1988
·
Ian Jewitt
·
Econometrica
·
578
Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets
1982
·
Stiglitz, Joseph E.
, Braverman, Avishay
·
American Economic Review
·
551
Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital
1988
·
GEORGE G. PENNACCHI
·
The Journal of Finance
·
516
Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
1983
·
Roger B. Myerson
·
Econometrica
·
508
Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models
2000
·
Bruno Jullien
·
Journal of Economic Theory
·
495
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
1990
·
Drew Fudenberg
, Jean Tirole
·
Econometrica
·
461
Robustness and Linear Contracts
2015
·
Gabriel Carroll
·
American Economic Review
·
449
The Simple Microeconomics of Public‐Private Partnerships
2014
·
ELISABETTA IOSSA
, DAVID MARTIMORT
·
Journal of Public Economic Theory
·
446
Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation
2002
·
Jean-Charles Rochet
, Lars A. Stole
·
The Review of Economic Studies
·
431
Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Contract-Theoretic Modeling Approach
2011
·
Lin Gao
, Xinbing Wang
, et al.
·
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
·
426
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Works count:
3,066
Citation count:
68,710
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