Fiscal federalism with a single instrument to finance Government
Year: 2005
Type: preprint
Abstract: The structure of each level of government in the United States has changed over the last 200 years. Wallis (2000) has presented empirical evidence that relates the dominance of each level not to the functions government decides to undertake (the expenditures it commits to), but to the costs and benefits of the financial instruments each level has available (the way each level extracts revenues). In this paper we provide theoretical evidence for this hypothesis. We show why two different levels of government (e.g. state and federal) would not want to use a common instrument to finance the same good.
Author: Carlos Maravall Rodríguez
Institution: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1505909445
