Work

Three-Types Models of Multidimensional Screening

Year: 2005

Type: preprint

Abstract: This paper analyzes the variety of optimal screening contracts in a relatively simple multidimensional framework a la Armstrong and Rochet (1999), when only three types of agents are present. It is shown, among other things, that the well known principle in optimal contract theory of `no distortion at the top' does not carry over to the multidimensional case.

Source: RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

DOI: 10.25431/11380_634623

Authors: BRIGHI, Luigi, M. D'Amato

Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W1555073762

Cites: 8

Cited by:

Related to: 10