Work

The Future of Deposit Insurance: An Analysis of the Alternatives

Year: 1989

Type: article

Abstract: Deposit insurance, while reducing the threat of bank runs, also lessens bankers incentives to control risks. Reforms of the deposit insurance system are necessary to discourage excessive risk taking such as characterized the recent S&L crisis. The adoption of market value accounting, early closing of failed banks, and exposing uninsured depositors and creditors to lossesall would give bankers less incentives to take excessive risks with insured deposits.

Source: RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

Authors: Anatoli Kuprianov, David L. Mengle

Institution: Fordham University

Language: English

Topic: Banking stability, regulation, efficiency

Subfield: Finance

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W1584969952

FWCI: 1.53

Cites:

Cited by: 3

Related to: 10