Moral Hazard as a Question of Incentive Compatibility : A Pedagogical Exposition
Year: 1990
Type: article
Abstract: This paper is intended to be a simple characterization of moral hazard in a competitive insurance market. While there have been many different interpretations of moral hazard, we assert that its basic nature can be most clearly understood if we formulate it as a question of incentive compatibility in a privacy-preserving, competitive economy under uncertainty. In such a context, it will be shown that a simple scheme of allocating risk-bearings of the Arrow-Debreu type is not free from moral hazard and that some amendment is needed for its prevention. The relation of this problem to the theories of monopoly and of overinsurance will also be discussed.
DOI: 10.15057/7825
Author: Takeshi Murota
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1600549726
