Work

Explanatory Judgment, Moral Offense and Value-Free Science

Year: 2015

Type: article

Abstract: A popular view in philosophy of science contends that scientific reasoning is objective to the extent that the appraisal of scientific hypotheses is not influenced by moral, political, economic, or social values, but only by the available evidence. A large body of results in the psychology of motivated-reasoning has put pressure on the empirical adequacy of this view. The present study extends this body of results by providing direct evidence that the moral offensiveness of a scientific hypothesis biases explanatory judgment along several dimensions, even when prior credence in the hypothesis is controlled for. Furthermore, it is shown that this bias is insensitive to an economic incentive to be accurate in the evaluation of the evidence. These results contribute to call into question the attainability of the ideal of a value-free science.

Source: Review of Philosophy and Psychology

DOI: 10.1007/s13164-015-0282-z

Authors: Matteo Colombo, Leandra Bucher, Yoel Inbar

Institutions: Tilburg University, Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, University of Toronto

Language: English

Topic: Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience

Field: Neuroscience

Domain: Life Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,090

Funder: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft