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Incorporating patient preferences into clinical trials

Year: 1998
Type: article
Abstract: Editor—Torgerson and Sibbald discuss the difficulties of assessing the relative merits of treatments when patients have strong preferences for one of the alternatives.1 In these circumstances, however, patients should not be expected to participate in randomised comparisons, and neither should the professionals caring for them. It is important to consider the bases of these preferences, particularly as there is a widespread and unsupported belief that new treatments are likely to be superior to existing alternatives.2 For example, it seems that people with diabetes who were being recruited to a randomised comparison of insulin pumps with conventional management were left with the impression that pumps represented an important advance (C Bradley, personal communication). Not surprisingly, therefore, those allocated to pumps were pleased, while those allocated to conventional management were disappointed. Randomisation thus created comparison groups that were incomparable in these psychological characteristics, and this may have had implications for compliance and evaluation of treatment outcome.3 Bradley’s response3 was to propose the partially randomised patient preference design to which Torgerson and Sibbald refer. Unfortunately, this does not help because it cannot distinguish between an effect of preferences and an effect of confounding of preferences with prognosis. Since it is impossible to randomise between sincerely held preferences, measuring their effects reliably requires a more complicated design, which was suggested originally by Rucker4 and recently discussed by McPherson et al.5 In this design, people are randomised between either a randomised comparison or a preference comparison. Genuine therapeutic effects may, however, be associated with preferences, over and above those related to adherence to treatment. Several blind trials show an advantage associated with adherence to placebo.5 Obtaining hard evidence on possible preference effects is problematic as it is difficult to distinguish reliably between simple therapeutic effects and preference effects mediated through psychological pathways in experiments. There are thus two areas that need attention. Firstly, there needs to be wider acknowledgement that preferences for treatments should be based on beliefs that are founded on reliable information. This should help to increase the proportion of well informed people who have no strong preferences and would thus be eligible to participate in comparisons between randomised treatments. Secondly, studies are required to enable a rigorous distinction to be made between simple therapeutic effects and preference effects. This means that well accepted biological hypotheses will be needed for adequate recruitment, and a plausible biological model to distinguish the two kinds of effect. As Torgerson and Sibbald suggest, however, the first step is routinely to elicit information about the preferences of well informed patients.
Source: BMJ
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W187696166
FWCI: 1.867
Cites: 9
Cited by: 42
Related to: 10