Verifying Privacy by Little Interaction and No Process Equivalence
Year: 2012
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: While machine-assisted verification of classical security goals such as confidentiality and authentication is\nwell-established, it is less mature for recent ones. Electronic voting protocols claim properties such as voter\nprivacy. The most common modelling involves indistinguishability, and is specified via trace equivalence in cryptographic extensions of process calculi. However, it has shown restrictions. We describe a novel model, based on unlinkability between two pieces of information. Specifying it as an extension to the Inductive Method allows us to establish voter privacy without the need for approximation or session bounding. The two\nmodels and their latest specifications are contrasted.
Authors: Denis Butin, Giampaolo Bella
Institutions: Dublin City University, University of Catania
Language: English
Subfield: Software
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W1902423