Integrated Sensor: A Backdoor for Hardware Trojan Insertions?
Year: 2015
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: Embedded system face a serious threat from physical attacks when applied in critical applications. Therefore, modern systems have several integrated sensors to detect potential threats. In this paper, we put forward a new issue where these sensors can open other security loopholes. We demonstrate that sensors, which are deployed to prevent faults, can be exploited to insert effective and almost zero-overhead hardware Trojans. Two case studies are presented on Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. The first case study exploits the in-build temperature sensor of Virtex-5 system monitors while the other exploits a user deployed sensor. Both the sensor can be used to trigger a powerful Trojan with minimal and at times zero overhead.
DOI: 10.1109/dsd.2015.119
Language: English
Subfield: Hardware and Architecture
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1915975010