Work

Two Models of Equality and Responsibility

Year: 2008
Type: article
Abstract: Much recent political philosophy has focused on the role of responsibility within liberal-egalitarian theories of justice, and much of that has been very critical of Rawls's Theory of Justice.This debate overlooks a central distinction within the taxonomy of theories of justice.There exist at least two visions of how a liberalegalitarian theory of justice can integrate considerations of distributive equality and, derivatively, responsibility.What differentiates these two versions is whether distributive equality is taken as immediately plausible or a direct expression of respect for persons (or a related notion), or whether distributive equality is derived only in the presence of additional claims about normatively relevant relationships among persons.These models imply distinct accounts of how responsibility may be integrated into accounts of liberalegalitarian justice.This fact allows us to show that, contrary to what has motivated much of recent political philosophy, as far as responsibility is concerned, Rawls's approach is not already problematic on its own terms.Dworkin, and John Roemer, for whom a major concern is to make more room for a suitable notion of responsibility.2 Their efforts are shaped by a distinction between "choice" and "circumstance:" individuals should possess distributive shares in accordance with their choices (for which they are responsible) and be compensated for disadvantages they have because of their circumstances (for which they are not.)These writers are sometimes called luck-egalitarians (cf.Anderson (1999) and Scheffler ( 2003)), but their concerns are more aptly emphasized by calling them, following Arneson, responsibility-catering egalitarians.There are two accounts of how responsibility-catering egalitarianism relates to Rawls's Theory.The first emphasizes continuity: Rawls offers insights about the role of responsibility in social justice but leaves them underdeveloped, and it is up to others to fill the gap.The second account emphasizes discontinuity: to the detriment of his theory, Rawls fails to discuss responsibility adequately, and thus social justice must be reconceived to accommodate an appropriate notion of responsibility.The continuity reading appears in Kymlicka (2002), and a recent interview suggests that Dworkin also endorses it (cf.Pauer-Studer (2002)).3 The discontinuity reading appears in Roemer (1996).We believe there are strands in Rawls (1999a) to support both readings, but on balance, as Scheffler (2003) also argues, the discontinuity approach is the better reading: the differences between a Rawlsian account of social justice and responsibility-catering 2 Cf.Cohen (1989), Dworkin (1981), Dworkin (2000), Arneson (1989), (1990) and (1997), and Roemer (1996).3 This is a bit surprising, since Dworkin (1981) introduces the criticism of Rawls that his difference principle is insensitive to questions of responsibility in terms that fit the discontinuity reading.Brian Barry seems to be at least sympathetic to the continuity view as well: cf.chapter 9 of Barry (1995), especially pp 54-55.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2000861207
FWCI: 2.541
Cites: 54
Cited by: 38
Related to: 10