Work

Multi-tasking, quality and pay for performance

Year: 2010

Type: article

Abstract: We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that: (i) the provider is (at least to some extent) altruistic; (ii) one dimension of quality is verifiable (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2); (iii) the two quality dimensions can be either substitutes or complements. Our main result is that setting the price equal to the marginal benefit of the verifiable quality dimension can be optimal even if the two quality dimensions are substitutes.

Source: Health Economics

DOI: 10.1002/hec.1582

Authors: Oddvar Kaarboe, Luigi Siciliani

Institutions: University of Bergen, Centre for Economic Policy Research, University of York

Language: English

Topic: Healthcare Policy and Management

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2007809627

FWCI: 9.017

Cites: 28

Cited by: 64

Related to: 10