Year: 2008
Type: article
Abstract: Together with developments in international criminal justice and humanitarian law, the human rights revolution in international law has had a profound structural effect on the international legal order as a whole; we are today only beginning to discern and to digest this effect, to say nothing of the broader consequences for global politics.1 New actors have been empowered in the international legal system (not only individuals but various kinds of non-state collectivities as well); conceptions of responsibility have been altered; classic notions, such as territorial sovereignty and recognition of statehood, have sometimes subtly and sometimes radically been reshaped or adapted; and the balance of institutional actors charged with interpreting and applying international law has shifted towards courts and tribunals (a major theme of Petersmann) and away from diplomats and their ministers.2 What, specifically, is the significance of these trends for international economic law? According to Petersmann, the human rights revolution alters or should alter the way that academics, practitioners, and tribunals look at the purposes and normative underpinnings of international economic law. While, according to Petersmann, there is a strong utilitarian case for the trade liberalization guarantees in international economic treaties such as the GATT,3 the human rights revolution now permits us to see the true nature of these legal dispositions: the ‘constitutional’ protection of a sphere of individual economic liberty against the state. As Petersmann would have it, the human rights revolution allows us to see this for two reasons. First, because it gives individuals a juridical status in the international order – as bearers of rights – thus focusing attention on the limits of the existing formal structures of international economic law, which, at least in the trade area, remain mired in the notion of state-to-state obligation despite the underlying economic activity protected being that of private actors, not states. Secondly, the human rights revolution imports into dispute settlement a conception of constitutional judicial review: the role of the adjudicator ought not to be that of an arbitrator seeking a satisfactory settlement between sovereign states, but rather her function is to discipline or constrain the sovereign state in order to protect the entrenched economic autonomy of the individual – freedom of contract and property rights. In terms of the American constitutional tradition, this vision would be termed Lochnerian, after the notorious 1920s case where the US Supreme Court struck down legislation limiting hours of work in bakeries on the basis of a concept of substantive due process that protected an individual's right to make a contract in her business.4 This concept of substantive due process was abandoned by the US Supreme Court in the 1930s; but, according to Petersmann, a similar notion is alive and well today in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): Even though the ECtHR respects a wide margin of appreciation of states to limit and interfere with property rights (e.g., by means of taxation) and to balance individual and public interests (e.g., in case of a taking of property without full compensation), the Court's expansive protection – as property or ‘possessions’ – of almost all pecuniary interests and legitimate expectations arising from private and public law relationships reveals a strong judicial awareness of the importance of private economic activities and economic law for effective protection of human rights and personal self-realization in the economy and civil society. The Court's review of governmental limitations of, and interferences with, property rights is based on ‘substantive due process’ standards that go far beyond the ‘procedural due process’ standards applied by the US Supreme Court since the 1930s [i.e., when the Lochner doctrine was abandoned] (at 779). Petersmann does not cite any supporting case law for the Lochnerism of the ECtHR. I am not an expert in the ECtHR jurisprudence; but my generalist's observational powers suggest that Lochnerian judicial activism, if it does exist in the ECtHR, has not done much to limit the scope or reach of government regulation of the economy in Europe. Should economic freedom – freedom of contract, private property rights – be protected against democratic majoritarian politics through human rights guarantees and judicial review? If so, what kind of balance ought to be struck between other interests (and indeed other rights) and economic rights? These are questions that engage legal and political philosophy. Petersmann's article is utterly lacking in detailed or rigorous reasoning on these questions; he writes as if mere mention of such high-sounding concepts as ‘self-realization’, ‘human dignity’, and the like could substitute for justification of his particular view of ‘self-realization’ or ‘human dignity’. We can give only the briefest indication here of the manner in which this rhetoric distorts the moral sensibility behind the post-World War II human rights revolution. The most telling example is Petersmann's treatment of Nazism. According to Petersmann: the wide-ranging guarantees of economic regulation and legally enforceable social rights in Germany's 1919 Constitution for the ‘Weimar Republic’ had led to ever more restrictive government interventions into labour markets, capital markets, interest rates, as well as to expropriations ‘in the general interest’ which – during the Nazi dictatorship from 1933 to 1945 – led to systemic political abuses of these regulatory powers.5 Petersmann thus suggests that the real sin of the Nazis, or what led to that sin, was abuses in the over-regulation of the marketplace. On this perspective, there is essentially no difference, morally or in human rights terms, between, for example, the taking of property as part of the systemic strategy of destruction of a people, and any other unjustified exercise of eminent domain. Petersmann invokes Rawls and Dworkin in support of the cause of constitutional judicial review; yet neither thinker has ever advocated Lochner-style constitutional jurisprudence which Petersmann identifies with the key function of constitutional judicial review. Indeed, Dworkin has explicitly criticized the libertarian approach to economic freedom under the constitution, and the doctrine of Lochner specifically.6 Dworkin's conception of constitutional judicial review most decidedly does not endorse the protection of a sphere of private economic autonomy against egalitarian regulatory intervention. Beyond these brief indications, the absence of sustained argument in Petersmann's article to which to respond makes it difficult for me in this comment to address theoretically the relationship of ‘economic freedom’, whether understood in libertarian terms or otherwise,7 to the vision of ‘humanity’ or ‘human dignity’ arguably implicit in, or driving, the human rights revolution in international law. I have articulated elsewhere, at length, a conceptual approach to the place of economic (and social) rights in constitutionalism, in the context of Canadian constitutional reform.8 I would add here only that rejection of Lochnerism does not entail turning a blind eye to human rights abuses because they take place in the economic sphere, or because the seizure of property and the denial of the right to earn a livelihood for instance are the means used to violate a person's human rights. Indeed, the reverse – because state intervention may be required to protect human rights in the economic sphere (equality and affirmative action legislation for instance) conceiving of economic rights in terms of a zone of autonomy secure from state intervention à la Lochner is as likely to undermine effective human rights protection in the economic sphere as to enhance it. Petersmann's unbalanced view of the issue – and his indifference to the ways in which private power can limit autonomy (unless it is consumer autonomy; he believes in anti-trust) – is well reflected in his reference to collective bargaining: the right to strike is an assault on companies’ ability to exercise their ‘market freedoms’ (at 18). The tension between Petersmann's Lochnerian vision and the positive international law of human rights is most evident in the case of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Examining the interaction of this instrument with WTO law leads to a dramatically different, indeed anti-Lochnerian, view of the relationship of the human rights revolution and international economic law. Instead of international human rights law enhancing the purported function of WTO legal norms as protections for private economic actors against the activist state, consideration of human rights implies flexibility under WTO law for the state to take positive action to protect individuals and communities against the excesses of economic globalization. For example, if states are fully to discharge their obligations with respect to the right to food or the right to health under the CESC, they may need to rely on various exceptions or safeguards provisions in WTO treaties. Interpreting such treaties in light of the human rights obligations in question would help to ensure that the exceptions or limitations provisions in question allow states the policy space to fulfil these obligations.9 Petersmann's presentation of the relationship of human rights to private economic activity, in addition to misrepresenting the significance of taking into account human rights law in the WTO, also arguably provides a very one-sided and inaccurate account of the European legacy of human rights. This legacy is reduced to the contribution of the judiciary to correction of ‘government failure’. His anti-state or anti-government bias (indeed, the notions of government and failure most often appear together in Petersmann's essay) blinds him to the extent that judicial activism with respect to human rights itself depends on a political culture supportive of human rights, and of the conception of human personality or humanity on which these rights are based. Petersmann himself cites Hamilton's observation that the judiciary is ‘the least dangerous branch’; when up against what Petersmann describes as ‘Machiavellic’ states, it suffers from all of the weaknesses and liabilities that Machiavelli himself attributes to ‘unarmed prophets’. Petersmann's image of constitutional review is really secularized Protestantism, which could be recognized as at the moral root of Weimar liberal legalism. The rule of law through the caste of judges was represented as redemption from the harshness and squalor of real political life – to which the almost inevitable and fateful (anti-liberal) response was to try and save the ‘political’ by moralizing the embrace of these ‘Machiavellic’ features as ‘decisionism’ or ‘resoluteness’. When Petersmann presents the triumph of human rights in Europe as a coup de grace by judges, he cannot help but add that it was accepted by parliaments and citizens. This notion of acceptance seems equivalent, in Petersmann's eyes, to the recognition of a saviour or redeemer – a mystical embrace. But we might ask, less apolitically, whether the ground of the acceptance was not the creation, on the ashes of World War II, of a political culture in Europe that was open to human rights, and whether the very governments or states that Petersmann describes as Machiavellic resisters to human rights supremacy did not play the decisive role in the creation of that culture – building a basis for social solidarity that did not depend on appeals to chauvinistic versions of national identity, and routing a possible revival of extremist anti-liberal politics (on the left and the right) through state-driven economic reconstruction and a wide variety of interventions to ensure social equality, as well as laws restrictive of racist speech and extremist political movements (which pointedly shows, at least in a time of political transition, that limits on ‘laissez-faire’ may be essential to the fulfilment of the human rights ideal).10 It is important to understand that one of Petersmann's primary objectives in recasting the legal obligations in international economic treaties in terms of individual human rights is to make a case for what is often called, perhaps rather loosely, ‘direct effect’ of WTO law. Petersmann believes that individual economic actors who have suffered harm from the failure of states to comply with obligations in such treaties should have a cause of action in domestic courts. Given Petersmann's identification of domestic enforcement of such obligations by individuals with Lochner-like constitutional economic rights, it would be a natural reflex for someone with a non- or anti-Lochnerian vision of international economic law to oppose categorically the possibility of such enforcement. But this would be a mistake. There is a broader policy issue here of whether international economic law – particularly WTO law – is ‘underenforced’ and indeed of what ‘underenforcement’ means. The dispute settlement provisions applicable in the WTO, the so-called Dispute Settlement Understanding, provide only for a prospective remedy, namely withdrawal or modification of the offending measure within a reasonable period of time; unilateral countermeasures by the injured state are available if this does not happen. Apparently, in this respect, the DSU modifies the customary rules of state responsibility which would require reparations for the harm suffered by the injured state while the measure was in place. The net result is arguably that the offending state gets a ‘free ride’ – at least a couple of years during which it can violate the WTO norms with impunity while the dispute complaint is wending its way through the system, and, quite likely, depending on how ‘reasonable period of time’ is interpreted, at least a year more to implement after a final judgment of the dispute settlement organs. There are arguments that this state of affairs undermines the effective incentives to comply with WTO law in the first place, and in fact that it is a betrayal of the rule of law ideal at the WTO. On the other hand, the current situation allows even risk-adverse governments to experiment with regulatory options which push the limits of WTO law, knowing that if it turns out that they are in violation the sole responsibility is to remove the measures for the future. In the presence of uncertainty about whether a given regulatory scheme may or may not be found to be in compliance with WTO rules, the absence of retrospective remedies may prevent a ‘chill’ effect on regulation, a concern that many progressives have about the damages remedies available in investor–state arbitration, for example. The benefits and costs of providing damages remedies for private actors thus need to be carefully weighed, along with other options for changing the remedies regime of the WTO.11 The issue can hardly be decided one way or the other simply by invoking the mantle of ‘human rights’. Regardless of one's view of the relevant human rights, Lochnerian or otherwise, the consideration in WTO adjudication of international human rights norms raises the structural and hermeneutic issues entailed in the application by one international legal regime of norms from another. I do not find the lengthy discussion by Petersmann of legal cooperation and practices of comity among European courts to be particularly illuminating of these international law issues: the problem with respect to WTO tribunals and human rights law is simply not one of overlapping in personam or subject-matter jurisdiction. It is perhaps the case, at least hypothetically, that the interpretation by a human rights tribunal of international human rights law in pending or on-going proceedings may be relevant to the use of that law by a WTO tribunal in interpreting a WTO Agreement; but Petersmann does not mention even a hypothetical situation where this could be the case, and after reading and re-reading the long discussion of Solange cooperation etc. I was left baffled by what this could offer in the way of guidance to a WTO from that it would need to attention to what the other tribunal about the of the human rights law in As Petersmann in his discussion of the case, the of the the WTO dispute settlement provisions do not appear to allow the possibility of of proceedings tribunal has a relevant for the WTO comity would to consideration of the manner in which human rights have the human rights norms in I endorse such and I fully that it be an important on the possibility that WTO tribunals Lochnerian of human rights into WTO dispute Petersmann's presentation of the relevant doctrine in international law is also not and in fact The that Petersmann cites for the that international human rights law should be into judicial interpretation and application of international economic law is the in the international instrument has to be and applied within the of the legal system at the time of the It is he should have this case, rather the which is more relevant to the since it with the interpretation and application of a in light of general international law this case on the use of where the of the adjudicator is based that This is to the situation of the WTO is based the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, and role is to the provisions of the WTO treaties respect to the of the WTO Petersmann suggests that WTO law does not provide an to WTO with to other relevant rules of international Petersmann often one-sided of WTO and on governmental and interests is not only reflected by the fact that human rights arguments have been in WTO dispute settlement It is quite to the of Petersmann's of if the case is would the WTO adjudicator need to have an to take into account human rights or other relevant international legal Secondly, more Petersmann no view on DSU which in that the WTO adjudicator is to the WTO treaties ‘in with customary rules of interpretation of public international The at as an to the rules in the on the of in the interpretation of WTO and of most which (at relevant rules of international law applicable between the as a of if Petersmann with the on the of DSU given that he the WTO adjudicator an to take into account other relevant rules of international but there is no discussion DSU would not be an The only when one that Petersmann does mention the on the of as applicable to adjudication in international economic law, but only the (at not the provisions on most In one from Petersmann's article a and of the international law applicable to the use of international law in the interpretation of the WTO This is not the place to provide an I the to the which the of WTO and the in this as well as to work of my Petersmann ‘the and of that it is no reasonable for national laws to the general among that trade and is more important for on (at the fact that no such among I on the of and of international economic law have been the For many the trade policy – trade and the like – and the law and of trade in a behind the and with a bias towards economic The creation of a judicial instance in the WTO, the has shifted in important respects the interpretation and application of the norms of the system from the of Petersmann but with quite – how and with respect to what purposes and in the light of what the rules ought to and applied has more and the that Petersmann attributes to a of has under much by a much of Petersmann the up of WTO dispute settlement to for example as a that the system to private economic actors, in fact the major and interests have been well and represented at the WTO, as they had the of The effect of the up through has been to at least the other the and interests of which or in the by the way the trade policy the had the to question what and other was right or from an economic but courts and judges are (and Petersmann himself to and justice to be as The of is much more attention and to the of the system, from many of and not that of the of private with respect to investor–state arbitration, the of investor–state decided by the of many of which are now and, as Petersmann where is in an of has to the terms of between and the governments and of the in which they and the of terms – an which was much more difficult where these simply by more or less behind the of power and through between often and I if Petersmann's is to or these through within the recasting that in what he to be the of human rights, a Lochnerian if not to most human rights this all the of this a human rights of on an hand, Petersmann has had to take and has up the which
DOI: 10.1093/ejil/chn060
Author: R. Howse
Institution: New York University
Language: English
Topic: World Trade Organization Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W2014722286
