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Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements

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Year: 2007
Type: article
Source: The Review of Economic Studies
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00450.x
Authors: KYLE HYNDMAN, DEBRAJ RAY
Institutions: Southern Methodist University, New York University
Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: coalition formation, binding agreements, characteristic function games, efficiency, absorbing states, veto power, externalities
SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: closed
OpenAlex ID: W2016281080
FWCI: 17.63
Cites: 39
Cited by: 97
Related to: 9
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