The Choice of Entry by Greenfield or Takeover
Year: 1994
Type: preprint
Abstract: An entrepreneur or a firm entering a new market has a choice of setting up a greenfield operation or of taking over a firm already in the market.Recent models of this choice have assumed that takeover occurs at a price set as a function of either incumbents' pre-entry profits or post-entry profits or, by some bargaining process, inbetween those.In this paper the takeover price is modelled endogenously, assuming the target firm is efficiently evaluated by a competitive stock market.This gives rise to a highly nonlinear relationship between the probability of entry by takeover and explanatory variables such as the entrant's technologica1 advantage, technological compatibility and the degree of incumbents' precommittment in entry-deterring investments.The non-linear relationship is confirmed empirically using data on a sample of Swedish product markets.The results imply that entrants are most likely to enter by takeover if they have a small to medium level of technological advantage over incumbents, while entry by greenfield is more likely if the entrant has either a very large technological advantage or a large disadvantage.
Authors: Stefan Fölster, Georgi Trofimov
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W201815127
