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The Optimal Institutional Design of Vertically Related Markets with Unknown Upstream Costs

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Year: 2013
Type: article
Source: Review of Network Economics
DOI: 10.1515/rne-2012-0014
Author: Raffaele Fiocco
Institution: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Language: English

Topic: Merger and Competition Analysis
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: vertical separation, unbundling, upstream monopoly, downstream competition, separation of ownership and control, legal separation, limited information, welfare, institutional design
SDGs: Peace, justice, and strong institutions, Industry, innovation and infrastructure

Open Access status: closed
OpenAlex ID: W2024959835
FWCI: 0.536
Cites: 35
Cited by: 2
Related to: 10
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