Quantum eavesdropping without interception: an attack exploiting the dead time of single-photon detectors
Year: 2011
Type: article
Abstract: The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) can easily be obscured if the eavesdropper can utilize technical imperfections in the actual implementation. Here, we describe and experimentally demonstrate a very simple but highly effective attack that does not need to intercept the quantum channel at all. Only by exploiting the dead time effect of single-photon detectors is the eavesdropper able to gain (asymptotically) full information about the generated keys without being detected by state-of-the-art QKD protocols. In our experiment, the eavesdropper inferred up to 98.8% of the key correctly, without increasing the bit error rate between Alice and Bob significantly. However, we find an even simpler and more effective countermeasure to inhibit this and similar attacks.
Source: New Journal of Physics
Authors: Henning Weier, Harald Krauss, Markus Rau, Martin Fürst, Sebastian Nauerth, Harald Weinfurter
Language: English
Subfield: Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics
Field: Physics and Astronomy
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $2,610
OpenAlex ID: W2055040985
