Year: 2010
Type: article
Abstract: In this paper we want to shed some light on what we mean by backward induction and forward induction reasoning in dynamic games. To that purpose, we take the concepts of common belief in future rationality (Perea [1]) and extensive form rationalizability (Pearce [2], Battigalli [3], Battigalli and Siniscalchi [4]) as possible representatives for backward induction and forward induction reasoning. We compare both concepts on a conceptual, epistemic and an algorithm level, thereby highlighting some of the crucial differences between backward and forward induction reasoning in dynamic games.
Source: Games
DOI: 10.3390/g1030168
Author: Andres Perea
Institution: Maastricht University
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $1,930
OpenAlex ID: W2080874369