Work

Attainability in Repeated Games with Vector Payoffs

Year: 2015

Type: article

Abstract: We introduce the concept of attainable sets of payoffs in two-player repeated games with vector payoffs. A set of payoff vectors is called attainable by a player if there is a positive integer such that the player can guarantee that in all finite game longer than that integer, the distance between the set and the cumulative payoff is arbitrarily small, regardless of the strategy Player 2 is using. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the attainability of a convex set, using the concept of B-sets. We then particularize the condition to the case in which the set is a singleton, and provide some equivalent conditions. We finally characterize when all vectors are attainable.

Source: Mathematics of Operations Research

DOI: 10.1287/moor.2014.0693

Authors: Dario Bauso, Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan, Xavier Venel

Institutions: University of Palermo, INSEAD, Tel Aviv University, Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funder: Agence Nationale de la Recherche

Award: Long term behaviour for discrete and continuous time dynamic games